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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, two models of money both due to Robert Townsend, have achieved a
high level of popularity in monetary economics. The first is the turnpike model (Townsend,
1980): here infinitely-lived agents with a periodic endowment stream travel along a turnpike
and trading restrictions imply that they can trade with each other at trading posts only via
the use of money. The second is the random relocation model (Townsend, 1987): typically
cast in the two-period overlapping generations framework, this is an environment in which
a fraction of two-period lived agents is stochastically relocated to an island (diﬀerent from
the one they were born in) and the only asset they can bring with them is currency.
At first blush, these models share many similarities; they are heterogenous-agent mod-
els wherein physical restrictions on the environment preclude the possibility of trade using
instruments other than money. Their main apparent diﬀerence is the length of the lifespan
of agents. Now, it is well-known that the Friedman rule, a famous prescription for mon-
etary policy, is optimal in the turnpike model with infinitely-lived agents1; it is not so in
the random relocation model with two-period lived agents.2 This paper investigates this
disparity and the role played by the length of agents’ lifespans in contributing to it.
This aforementioned divergence is interesting because it mirrors the disparity between
theory and practice concerning the optimum quantity of money. Theory has shown the
Friedman rule to be optimal in many diﬀerent environments and under many diﬀerent as-
sumptions (see, for example, Kimbrough 1986; Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe 1996; Correia
and Teles 1996). Yet, in practice, no central bank (CB) has a stated objective of imple-
menting the Friedman rule. If indeed the length of agents’ lifespans matters, we would
expect most monetary models — in particular, ones in which agents are infinitely lived —
to be inadequate in answering practical policy questions about the optimum quantity of
1See Ljunqvist and Sargent (2001) for a discussion.
2See Smith (2002 a and b) and Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2004) for elaboration and discussion
of this result.
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money.
In this paper, we create a modified version of the turnpike model that generates the
same stationary monetary equilibria as does the two-period overlapping generations (OG)
model with random relocation. The equivalence between the model with infinitely-lived
agents and the one with finitely-lived agents is achieved by incorporating the frictions
(present in the latter) in the former. We show that the objective function of a benevolent
central bank in the two economies is identical, up to a linear transformation. As such, the
optimal monetary policy deviates from the Friedman rule in either economy even though
agents’ lifespans are vastly diﬀerent (infinity versus two) across them. In addition we show
that there is a N -period (N finite) lived “modified” turnpike model that produces the
same stationary equilibria as the two-period lived OG model with random relocation. In
this sense, we have demonstrated that the equivalence is intact whether agents have finite
or infinite lifespans. Therefore, the length of agents’ lifespans is not the reason why the
Friedman rule is suboptimal.
We extend the analysis further to examine whether it matters if the economy has an
initial date or not. We find that the Friedman rule is suboptimal in economies without an
initial date while it is the best policy when there is an initial date. When there is an initial
date, some agents must be holding the initial money stock. Deviations from the Friedman
rule make these agents worse oﬀ as money becomes less valuable. In contrast, when there
is no initial date, no agent is holding the initial money stock. Thus, deviations from the
Friedman rule are less desirable when there is an initial date than when there is not.
Our findings are important on two dimensions. First, we show that the length of life of
agents is not important for the suboptimality of the Friedman rule. This finding, therefore,
suggests there is nothing special about length of life in OG economies; the same frictions
can be introduced in economies populated by infinitely lived agents where they have the
same eﬀects. Second, we clarify the role played by an initial period in evaluating optimal
monetary policy decisions. When there is no initial date, the CB needs only to be concerned
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with equating the social and private costs of using money. In this setting, the Friedman
rule is suboptimal. When there is an initial date, the welfare loss to the (initial) holders of
money that is created by deviations from the Friedman rule is explicitly taken into account.
Deviations from the Friedman rule, therefore, are less desirable.3
Our work is part of a burgeoning literature studying environments with heterogeneity
in which the Friedman rule is not optimal (see, for example, the seminal work of Levine
(1991), among others). Levine (1991) considers an environment in which there are two
types of infinitely-lived agents who randomly become buyers or sellers and information on
agents’ type is private. If buyers value consumption suﬃciently more than sellers do, and
if there is some randomness in the economy, then Levine shows that the optimal monetary
policy is expansionary and not contractionary as the Friedman rule would suggest. We
extend the treatment of hetereogeneity to include settings in which agents who hold the
initial money stock are diﬀerent from those that do not. Indeed, our results complement
Levine’s in that we show that it also matters whether society’s objective function puts a
big enough weight on the welfare of the initial moneyholders.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes an OG environ-
ment in which the Friedman rule is suboptimal. Section 3 describes the turnpike model
introduced by Townsend (1980). Section 4 describes a modified turnpike economy with
infinitely-lived agents and shows that it solves the same set of equations as the OG en-
vironment described in section 2. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. The
appendices contain proofs of the main results as well as an extension to N period lived
agents.
3Together, our results add to insights forwarded in Levine (1991). Specifically, he shows that in models
with heterogeneous agents, the Friedman rule will be suboptimal. Our results indicate that heterogeneity
is not suﬃcient for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal. Rather, it matters whether society’s objective
function puts big enough weight on on welfare of the initial moneyholders that also plays an important role.
4
2 A OG model with random relocation and limited commu-
nication
We start by presenting a model economy that is populated by a unit mass of two-period
overlapping generations of agents located in two spatially separated locations.4 We consider
two alternative settings: one with an initial date, in which time is denoted by t = 1, 2, ...,
and one with no initial date, in which case time is denoted by t = ...,−1, 0, 1, ... Agents
receive an endowment of ω units of the single consumption good when young and nothing
when old. Only old-age consumption is valued. Let ct denote old-age consumption of the
members of the generation born at date t; their lifetime utility is given by u(ct) =
c1−ρt
1−ρ ,
where ρ ∈ (0, 1). If the economy has an initial date, then there also is an initial old
generation. Each member is endowed with an amount of cash M0. The consumption of
the members of the initial old generation is denoted by c10.
The timing of events is as follows. Agents receive their endowment at the start of a
period. Under standard assumptions discussed in Schreft and Smith (1997), they will find
it in their best interest to deposit their entire endowment into a bank before they learn
their relocation status. Let α denote the probability (assumed symmetric across locations)
that an agent will be relocated. We assume a law of large numbers holds so α is also the
measure of agents that is relocated. Goods deposited in the bank can be used to acquire
money or they may be put into storage.
Each unit of the consumption good put into storage at date t yields x > 1 units of the
consumption good at date t+1, where x is a known constant. We assume that currency is
the only asset that can be transported between locations and that limited communication
prevents the cross-location exchange of privately issued liabilities. Therefore relocated
agents will seek to liquidate their holdings of storage to obtain currency. Relocation thus
plays the role of a “liquidity preference shock”, and it is natural to assume that banks arise
4Our formulation follows Townsend (1987), and Schreft and Smith (1997). Only a concise description
of the environment is provided here; the reader is referred to Schreft and Smith (1997) for details.
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to insure agents against these shocks. Storage is therefore necessary for banks to exist
for without it, agents would use the only store of value available — money balances; then
limited communication would have no bite. Upon learning their relocation status, movers
redeem their bank deposits in the form of money. In contrast, nonmovers redeem their
deposits in the form of goods when old.
The CB can levy lump-sum taxes τ on the endowment of agents by collecting the
tax in the form of money balances removed from the economy. In contrast, a lump-sum
subsidy is received in the form of a money injection. The money supply evolves according
to Mt+1 = (1 + z)Mt and z is chosen by the CB in a manner that will be explained below.
We assume x ≥ 1/(1+ z) implying that the return on money is no greater than the return
on storage; otherwise, no one would ever want to hold storage and again banks would
disappear. Let pt denote the time t price level; in steady states, pt+1 = (1 + z) pt. Since
we focus solely on steady-states, we often suppress the time subscript in what follows.
Agents deposit their entire after-tax/transfer endowments with a bank. The bank
chooses the gross real return it pays to movers, dm, and to nonmovers, dn. In addition,
the bank chooses values m (real value of money balances) and s (storage investment)
respectively. These choices must satisfy the bank’s balance-sheet constraint
m+ s ≤ ω − τ . (1)
Banks behave competitively, so they take the return on their investments as given.
They must hold suﬃcient liquidity to meet the needs of movers:
αdm(ω − τ) ≤ m
1 + z
. (2)
A similar condition for non-movers, who consume all the proceeds from the storage tech-
nology, is given by
(1− α)dn(ω − τ) ≤ xs. (3)
Because of free entry, banks choose their portfolio, in equilibrium, in a way that maximizes
6
the expected utility of a representative depositor. The bank’s problem is written as
max
dm,dn
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
n
α (dm)1−ρ + (1− α) (dn)1−ρ
o
(4)
subject to equations (1), (2), and (3).
Let γ ≡ m/(ω − τ) denote the bank’s reserve-to-deposit ratio. Then, since x ≥
(1 + z)−1 , equations (1), (2), and (3) hold with equality, the bank’s objective function
is to choose γ to maximize
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
(
αρ
∙
γ
1 + z
¸1−ρ
+ (1− α)ρ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ
)
. (5)
It is easy to check that the reserve to deposit ratio chosen by the bank is given by
γ(z) =
1h
1 + 1−αα {(1 + z)x}
1−ρ
ρ
i (6)
and that it increases as 1 + z decreases. Using (6), it is possible to compute dm, dn, τ etc,
all as functions of the money growth rate z.
2.1 The economy without an initial date
In this case, there is no initial old to consider and therefore the objective of the CB is to
maximize the stationary utility of a representative generation. Formally, the CB chooses
the rate of growth of the money supply, z, to maximize (5), where γ is given by equation
(6). The solution to this problem is the Golden rule monetary policy [see Freeman, 1993].
Proposition 1 The steady state welfare maximizing rate of growth of the money supply
in this economy is given by z = 0.
The Friedman rule is defined as the rate of growth of the money supply which equates
the rate of return of money with the rate of return on storage. Formally, 1 + zFR = 1/x.
Proposition (1) makes clear that the Friedman rule is diﬀerent than the stationary welfare
maximizing policy in this economy.
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The intuition for this result is presented in Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2004).
From the perspective of society, acquiring goods with money is equivalent to storing goods
at rate of return of 1. The CB chooses z so that the private marginal cost of using money
is equal to its social marginal cost.
2.2 The economy with an initial date
Now consider an economy with an initial date and a mass of initial old who are endowed
with money, and for whom consumption is equal to the real value of money balances.
Then, c01 =M0/p1, where it may be checked that
M0
p1
= γ(z)(ω−τ(z))(1+z) . We posit the following
objective function for the CB:
W (z) = (1− β)
³
M0
p1
´1−ρ
1− ρ + β
{Ω(z)}1−ρ
1− ρ Γ(z) (7)
where Ω(z) := ω − τ (z), and Γ(z) := αρ
h
γ(z)
1+z
i1−ρ
+ (1 − α)ρ [(1− γ (z))x]1−ρ. It can be
verified that this objective function corresponds to the case where the CB maximizes the
discounted sum of all generations’ expected utility. Under this alternative interpretation,
β can be thought of as the CB’s discount factor. The CB takes β as given and chooses
z to maximize its objective function. We consider diﬀerent values of the weight for the
initial old generation and all other generations. For example, if β = 0, then the CB only
considers the utility of the initial old. Conversely, as β → 1, the weight of the initial old
goes to zero and so the CB maximizes the utility of a representative generation (in steady
states) and entirely ignores the initial old.
Proposition 2 The optimal rate of growth of the money supply in this economy is given
by
1 + z = 1− 1− β
1− β(1− αρ) , (8)
subject to the constraint that 1 + z ≥ 1x .
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Given α > 0, it is straightforward to see that if β → 1, then 1+z → 1. This corresponds
to the optimality of a constant money stock as in Proposition (1). When the CB ignores the
initial old, the optimal monetary policy coincides with the optimal policy in an economy
with no starting date. As β → 0, in the limit the CB places all weight on the initial old.
Since the initial old are made better oﬀ by a monetary policy that raises the real value of
their money holdings, deflation is best; indeed, the constraint 1 + z ≥ 1x eventually binds
and the best feasible monetary policy is the Friedman rule.5
In an economy with no initial date, nobody holds the initial stock of money and all
agents agree on what the optimal policy is. When there is an initial date, the CB must also
take into account the eﬀect of its policy on the agents holding the initial stock of money.
The welfare of these agents decreases when the CB deviates from the Friedman rule since
such deviations reduce the value of the initial stock of money. Hence, with an initial date,
we find that deviations from the FR are less desirable then when there is no initial date.
Note that if βx > 1, the return on storage is so great, compared to the rate at which
the CB weights the expected utility of future generations relative to the initial old, that the
CB would like assets in the economy to accumulate. This would allow future generations
to consume more than early generations. Of course, the CB cannot force agents to transfer
resources to future generations. By increasing z, however, the CB reduces the return on
money and can provide incentives for agents to save more in the storage technology.
If we restrict our attention to values of β such that βx ≤ 1, then the CB always chooses
the Friedman rule. Indeed, we can rewrite equation (8) to get
1 + z =
αρ
1
β − (1− αρ)
.
5See, also Gahvari (1988) and Ireland (2004). In this proposition, social welfare is lower under the
Friedman rule than under a constant-money-stock policy. When there is no initial date, the CB’s objective
function is a weighted sum of the welfare of identical agents. As the reader will see, when there is an
initial date, there is heterogeneity in the form of diﬀerent money holdings. With an initial date, welfare is
non-comparable under diﬀerent CB policies because one type will realize higher utility and the other type
will realize lower utility.
9
If βx ≤ 1, then
αρ
1
β − (1− αρ)
≤ α
ρ
x− (1− αρ) ≤
1
x
.
In many cases the CB would like to set a rate of growth of the money supply lower than
the Friedman rule but this is not feasible since in that case nobody would store goods.
3 The Townsend Turnpike Model
We begin this section by reviewing the turnpike model developed in Townsend (1980) and
described in detail in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000).
In the turnpike model, there is a single, perishable consumption good and a countably
infinite number of infinitely-lived agents. There are two types of agents, diﬀering in their
endowment patterns. Specifically, type-E agents are endowed with ω unit of the consump-
tion good at even dates and nothing at odd dates. Type-O agents are endowed with ω unit
of the consumption good at odd dates and nothing at even dates. Each type-O agent is
endowed with M0 units of fiat money at date 0 while the type- E agents are moneyless.
Both types of agents wish to consume each period. In addition, there are two restrictions
on market participation. First, at each date t, there is a single pairing of one type-E and
one type-O populating a market. Second, a type-E will be paired with the specific type-O
agents only once. These restrictions, combined with the absence of any common agent or
intermediary, eliminates the possibility of private loans and debt issues. It is this friction
that opens a social role for fiat money.
Without loss of generality, suppose the recipient is endowed with one unit of the con-
sumption good. Type-O agents are endowed with one unit of the consumption good in odd
periods and type-E agents are endowed with one unit of the consumption good in even
periods. The optimal consumption allocation for type E in even dates and for type O in
odd dates is given by
cˆ =
(1 + z)
1
ρω
(1 + z)
1
ρ + β
1
ρ
, (9)
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with unendowed agents consuming the remainder 1− cˆ given by
1− cˆ = β
1
ρω
β
1
ρ + (1 + z)
1
ρ
.
Why is there a gap between cˆ and 1−cˆ? The reason has to do with the odd-even endowment
pattern. If the return on money is less than 1/β, agents prefer to consume a unit of good
today than to consume tomorrow goods they have bought with the cash equivalent of a unit
of goods today. Hence they consume more at dates when they receive their endowments
than at other dates. As π increases, the return to money falls thereby increasing the
gap between odd and even period consumption. Clearly, the two converge as (1 + z)→ β.
Moreover, the gap increases as (1+z) increases. Notice that the gap introduces fluctuations
in agent’s consumption sequences which hurts a risk-averse agent in an ex-ante sense. Not
surprisingly, the Friedman rule eliminates the fluctuation and implements the first best
here.
Proposition 3 The optimal monetary policy is to set (1 + z) = β, i.e., to follow the
Friedman rule.
In the next section, we present a slight variation to the standard turnpike model that
is enough to destroy the optimality of the Friedman rule. As will be evident, the alteration
introduced essentially allows us to mimic the OG random relocation with finitely-lived
agents in a turnpike model with infinitely lived agents.
4 A modified turnpike economy
In this section, we present a modified version of the model economy introduced in the
previous section. The Friedman rule will not be ex-ante optimal for reasons that are similar
to those which lead to the suboptimality of the Friedman rule in the random-relocation
OG model.
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We consider both a version in which there is an initial date and one without. The
former is captured by t = 1, 2, ..., and the latter is captured by t = ...,−1, 0, 1, ... As in the
standard turnpike model, here too there are two types of agents: Type-E (type-O) agents
receive an endowment ω at even (odd) dates. There are as many type-E agents as type-O
agents. We assume that each agent of type-E is paired with a specific type-O agent. Such
a pairing occurs every period and two agents never meet more than once. As before, the
single-meeting assumption and the absence of a common agent accounts for why credit is
not an acceptable means of payment. 6
We now introduce the aforementioned modifications to preferences and technology. We
modify technology in the sense that we allow agents access to a technology that stores
their endowment from date t to date t + 1 at a gross return of x. We modify preferences
in the following way. Agents no longer like to consume in each period. Specifically, type-E
agents do not derive utility from consumption on even dates and type-O agents do not
derive utility from consumption on odd dates. Type-E (type-O) agents derive utility from
consuming their stored endowment on odd (even) dates. Type-E (type-O) agents also
derive utility from consuming type-O’s (type-E’s) endowment good at odd (even) dates.
These modifications to the preferences of agents guarantee that, in equilibrium, money is
valued and storage is used. In this environment, money is still needed for transactions
because agents need a medium of payment for goods they buy from the other type on a
date when the other type does not want goods in exchange. Storage is used since it is the
only way for agents to consume their own good in periods when they do not receive their
endowment.7 Also notice that each agent consumes every other period. This allows us
6Following the turnpike tradition, we consider infinitely lived agents in this modified economy. In
Appendix C, we demonstrate that it is possible to generalize the length of life to any arbitrary number
of even periods. We show that the length of life does not matter in the sense that our key findings are
retained.
7To fix ideas, we suggest the following fable. Suppose milk and cheese are perfect substitutes. All agents
receive an endowment of milk (some at odd dates, others at even dates). At the time they receive their
endowment, agents are not thirsty but can store the milk to turn it into cheese next period at the rate of
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to keep the model in line with the random relocation OG economy presented in section 2
where agents cared only about their old age consumption.
Let ch denote the consumption of an agent’s stored endowment good and cf denote the
consumption of the other type’s endowment good. If t0 is an even date, the preferences of
type-E agents at date t0 can be written as
∞X
t=t0
β2(t−t0)+1
h
u(cht ) + u(c
f
t )
i
(10)
and the preferences of type-O agents at date t0 can be written as
∞X
t=t0
β2(t−t0)
h
u(cht ) + u(c
f
t )
i
. (11)
If t0 is an odd date, the preferences of type-E agents at date t0 is given by equation (11)
while the preferences of type-O agents at date t0 is given by equation (19). When the
economy has an initial date, type-E agents hold money at date zero and get utility only
from consuming the endowment good of type-O agents.
The CB chooses z, the rate of growth of the money supply. Money is injected or removed
from the economy through lump-sum taxes or subsidies. To facilitate the analogy with the
OG setup, we assume the CB levies the tax/subsidy on type-E agents on even dates and
on type-O agents at odd dates. Thus, in equilibrium, the CB will levy the tax/subsidy on
agents who are holding money.8
We assume in this section that β, the agents’ discount factor is equal to 1/x, the inverse
of the return on the storage technology. Under this assumption, the Friedman rule equates
the return on money with the return on storage and corresponds to a deflation at a rate
of β. If we allowed βx > 1 then agents would want to accumulate assets and the economy
x units of cheese per unit of milk stored. In the following period, agents derive utility from consuming the
cheese they have produced as well as the milk that other agents have received as endowment. Money is
used to buy fresh milk but not to buy cheese.
8Other assumptions about when the taxes/subsidies are being levied do not modify the results. However,
they complicate the exposition; for example when lump-sum taxes are raised from each agent in every period,
some agents have to hold money for the sole purpose of paying the tax.
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would be growing. With βx < 1, the economy would not grow but we would have to take
a stand as to whether the Friedman corresponds to equalizing the return on money and
storage or to a deflation at a rate of β. In either case, our main results would hold: Without
an initial date the optimal z is greater than the Friedman rule for either definition. With
an initial date the optimal z is no greater that the Friedman rule.
4.1 The economy without an initial date
When there is no initial date, the problem faced by both types of agents is identical. Indeed,
the problem of a type-E agent on an even date is the same as the problem of a type-O
agent on an odd date. The problem of any agent can be written recursively as
V = maxβ
h
u(ch) + u(cf )
i
+ β2V, (12)
subject to
m+ s ≤ (ω − τ) ,
cf ≤ m
1 + z
,
ch ≤ xs.
Under the assumption u(c) = c
1−ρ
1−ρ , where ρ ∈ (0, 1), and defining γ ≡ m/(ω− τ), it is easy
to check that (12) reduces to
V =
β
1− β2
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
(∙
γ
1 + z
¸1−ρ
+ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ
)
. (13)
Equations (13) and (5) are identical when α = 1/2 up to a linear transformation. Thus,
the objective function of agents in our modified turnpike economy without an initial date
is the same as the objective function of a representative generation in the OG environment.
The implication is stated in the following proposition.9
9 It is probably useful to oﬀer an interpretation of the homomorphism that exists. Note that there is
an equal number of type-E and type-O agents in the Turnpike model. By this assumption, we guarantee
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Proposition 4 The optimal rate of growth of the money supply in this economy is given
by z = 0.
The proof is omitted since this result follows directly from the fact that the CB solves
the same problem in the environments in this section and the OG environment without
an initial date described in section 2. As before, it follows that the Friedman rule is not
optimal in this economy.
To get some intuition about this result it is useful to compare the original turnpike
model with our modified version. In the original model, because goods cannot be converted
into storage, the choice of z by the central bank only influences how goods are divided
between agents in each period. The Friedman rule achieves the eﬃcient allocation because it
completely smoothes consumption across types. In the modified model, storage is available,
so each agent faces a portfolio-choice problem. The choice is between investing in the
storage technology or acquiring money. Note that this is exactly the same choice as that
faced by banks in the OG model.
It is possible now to fully elaborate on the role that money plays. Propositions 1 and
4 identify the same optimal monetary policy; the money stock is constant. At z = 0, the
social objective function is maximized where the social cost and the private opportunity
cost of holding money are equal. The private opportunity are easy to conceptualize: for z >
β−1, storage rate-of-return dominates money. Hence, there is a private opportunity cost to
every agent that holds money. In these two model economies, money is the means by which
an agent participates in exchanges. Hence, there is a social opportunity costs associated
with money because the set of possible trades shrinks if money does not exist. 10 At values
that there is always a match at each reststop along the turnpike. The case with α = 1/2 is symmetric
to assumption of equal-sized groups in the Turnpike setting. In words, α = 1/2 says that the number of
movers in the OG random relocation economy who want to acquire units of the consumption good with
money are exactly the same size, in terms of the fraction of an island’s population, as the number of agents
that wish to acquire the consumption by exchanging money for goods in the Turnpike model.
10For example, in the OG economies, the exchange is an intergenerational transfer. For the modified
turnpike economies, the exchange is an inter-reststop transfer.
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of z < 0, for example, the private opportunity costs are less than the social opportunity
costs of the exchanges. In this case, the social opportunity costs of the exchanges exceeds
their private opportunity costs of holding money. The "excess" social opportunity cost is
borne in the form of lower after-tax resources and, thus, lower welfare. For our purposes, it
is important to note that the length of life does not aﬀect these welfare calculations when
no initial date is specified.
4.2 The economy with an initial date
At the initial date t = 1, the problem for type-O agents is not modified compared to the
case without initial date. Thus, we can write
V O =
β
1− β2
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
(∙
γ
1 + z
¸1−ρ
+ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ
)
.
The problem for type-E agents, however, is diﬀerent. Indeed, at date 1 these agents hold
money which they can use to buy the endowment good of type-O agents. From date 2
onward, the problem of type-E agents looks like the problem when there is no initial date.
It follows that we can write type-E’s problem
u(cf0) + βV
E,
where
V E = β
h
u(ch) + u(cf )
i
+ β2V E,
subject to
m+ s ≤ (ω − τ) ,
cf ≤ m
1 + z
,
ch ≤ xs.
Date-1 consumption for type-E agents is equal to the real value of the money they
possess, M0/p1. Equations (16), (17), and (18), in the appendix, hold in this environment.
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We can thus write the problem of type-E agents as
u(cf0) + βV
E = u(
γω
(1 + z)− γz ) +
β2
1− β2
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
(∙
γ
1 + z
¸1−ρ
+ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ
)
.
Ex-ante welfare in this economy is given by W = u(cf0) + βV
E + V O. It is the sum of the
utility of type-E and type-O agents. Hence, we have
W = u(
γω
(1 + z)− γz ) +
β
1− β
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
(∙
γ
1 + z
¸1−ρ
+ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ
)
. (14)
Equations (14) and (7) are the same, up to a linear transformation, when α = 1/2. From
proposition 2, the CB would like to set 1 + z = β2
−ρ
1−β(1−2−ρ) . Note that the optimal policy,
absent any constraint, would be to set money growth so that the return to money is greater
than the return to storage; however this is infeasible. The CB thus sets 1+ z = β, the best
feasible policy. The implication is that the Friedman rule is the best policy the CB can
achieve.
In the modified turnpike environment, β is the discount factor of agents populating
the economy. We have assumed that β = 1/x so that the Friedman rule corresponds to
a deflation at a rate β and also equate the return on money with the return on storage.
Under that assumption, the Friedman rule is the best feasible monetary policy when there
is an initial date.
The intuition for the fact that the value of z chosen by the CB is lower in the model
with an initial date than in the model without an initial date is the same as with the OG
model. With an initial date, some agents are holding the initial stock of money. These
agents are made worse oﬀ when z increases as the value of the money they hold decreases.
Thus deviations from the Friedman rule are less desirable in an economy with an initial
date.
Here, the intuition relating marginal social costs to private opportunity costs is modi-
fied. At 1 + z = β, the private opportunity costs equal zero. The marginal social cost is
also zero. The key diﬀerence is that with an initial date, we must take into account the
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agents holding the initial stock of money. In this setting, the welfare gain to these initial
moneyholders oﬀsets the "excess" social cost borne by those agents that do not have any
money at the initial date. With this modified version of social opportunity costs, private
opportunity and marginal social costs are equated at Friedman rule.
5 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we constructed an environment populated by infinitely-lived agents which
solves the same set of equations as an OG model. From this we learn that there exists a
representation of a model economy populated by infinitely-lived agents that is exactly the
same as an OG model economy populated by finitely lived agents. As such, the monetary
policy results that are derived in the OG setup carry over to the infinite-horizon setting.
More specifically, under conditions in which the Friedman rule is not optimal in the OG
model economy, the Friedman rule is not optimal in the model economy populated by
agents that live infinitely long. In other words, finite lives do not matter. This allows us
to establish that the key element for the suboptimality of the Friedman rule in this type
of model is the heterogeneity of agents and not the fact that they have finite lives.
Further, our results demonstrate that the existence of an initial date plays an important
role. When there is no initial date, no agent holds the initial stock of money and, thus, all
agents agree on what the optimal monetary policy is. When there is an initial date, those
agents who hold the initial stock of money are made worse oﬀ by an increase in the rate
of growth of the money supply. Thus, deviations from the Friedman rule are less desirable
when there is an initial date.
Our results address two important issues. First, finite lives are not crucial to an analysis
of the ex-ante optimal monetary policy. Second, whether or not the initial date is treated
explicitly matters. Whether or not agents have finite lives, if there is no initial date, the
Friedman rule is sub-optimal. If there is an initial date, the Friedman rule is the best
feasible policy.
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Our analysis is silent on the eﬀect of changing the length of the decision-making hori-
zon of agents. Notice that in all three models discussed, the standard turnpike, the OG
model, and the modified turnpike, agents face two-period problems. The periodic nature
of the endowment stream in both the turnpike models converts them into models in which
infinitely-lived agents face an infinitely repeated sequence of two-period problems. It would
be interesting to consider what eﬀect changing the decision making horizon would have on
the optimality of the Friedman rule, a topic we leave to future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
First define
Ω(z) ≡ ω − τ (z) = ω 1 + z
1 + z − zγ(z) ,
Γ(z) ≡ αρ
∙
γ (z)
1 + z
¸1−ρ
+ (1− α)ρ [(1− γ (z))x]1−ρ .
The objective function of the planner is thus given by
W (z) =
Ω(z)1−ρ
1− ρ Γ(z)
Taking the derivative of W (z) and setting it equal to zero yields
Ω(z)1−ρΓ(z)
1 + z
∙
1 + z
Ω(z)
∂Ω(z)
∂z
+
1
1− ρ
1 + z
Γ(z)
∂Γ(z)
∂z
¸
= 0. (15)
It can be verified that
∂Γ(z)
∂z
= αρ (1− ρ) 1
1 + z
µ
γ(z)
1 + z
¶1−ρ
,
∂Ω(z)
∂z
= Ω(z)
"
1
1 + z
−
1− γ(z) + z ∂γ(z)∂z
1 + z + zγ(z)
#
,
and
∂γ(z)
∂z
=
1− ρ
ρ
γ(z)
1 + z
(γ(z)− 1) .
Using these expressions, it is easy to show that
1
1− ρ
1 + z
Γ(z)
∂Γ(z)
∂z
= −γ(z),
and
1 + z
Ω(z)
∂Ω(z)
∂z
=
γ(z)
h
1 + 1−ρρ z (γ(z)− 1)
i
1 + z − zγ(z) .
Substituting these two expressions into equation (15), it can be established that
∂W (z)
∂z
= 0⇔ z = 0.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Note that, in steady states,
−τ = Mt −Mt−1
pt
= m
µ
z
1 + z
¶
(16)
m = γ (ω − τ) = γω (1 + z)
(1 + z)− γz (17)
and hence,
M0
p1
=
M1
p1
M0
M1
= m
1
1 + z
=
γω
(1 + z)− γz . (18)
Substitute the relevant expressions into the CB’s objective function and take the deriv-
ative with respect to z, to get
µ
γ(z)ω
1 + z − zγ(z)
¶−ρ ⎡
⎣
∂γ(z)
∂z ω (1 + z − zγ(z))− γ(z)ω
³
1− γ(z)− z ∂γ(z)∂z
´
(1 + z − zγ(z))2
⎤
⎦
+
β
1− β
Ω(z)1−ρΓ(z)
1 + z
∙
1 + z
Ω(z)
∂Ω(z)
∂z
+
1
1− ρ
1 + z
Γ(z)
∂Γ(z)
∂z
¸
= 0
It can be verified that
1
1− ρ
1 + z
Γ(z)
∂Γ(z)
∂z
= −γ(z)
and
1 + z
Ω(z)
∂Ω(z)
∂z
=
γ(z) + (1 + z)z ∂γ(z)∂z
1 + z − zγ(z) .
After rearranging, we getµ
γ(z)ω
1 + z − zγ(z)
¶−ρ
ω
"
∂γ(z)
∂z (1 + z)− γ(z) (1− γ(z))
(1 + z − zγ(z))2
#
+
β
1− β
Γ(z)
1 + z
(ω (1 + z))1−ρ
(1 + z − zγ(z))1−ρ
z
h
∂γ(z)
∂z (1 + z)− γ(z) (1− γ(z))
i
(1 + z − zγ(z)) = 0,
which simplifies to
γ(z)−ρ +
β
1− βΓ(z) (1 + z)
−ρ z = 0.
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Note
Γ(z) = αρ
µ
γ(z)
1 + z
¶1−ρ
+ (1− α)ρ [(1− γ(z))x]1−ρ
=
µ
α
γ(z)
¶ρ γ(z)
(1 + z)1−ρ
+
µ
1− α
1− γ(z)
¶ρ
(1− γ(z))x1−ρ.
From the bank’s maximization we have, αρ 11+z
³
γ(z)
1+z
´−ρ
−
³
1−α
1−γ(z)
´ρ
x1−ρ = 0, so that
Γ(z) =
µ
α
γ(z)
¶ρ 1
(1 + z)1−ρ
.
Substitution for Γ in the above expression, we get
γ−ρ = − β
1− βα
ργ−ρ (1 + z)−1 z.
With a little algebra this becomes
1 + z = 1− 1− β
1− β(1− αρ) .
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C Does length of life matter?
In this appendix, we show that the length of life does not matter. To achieve this aim,
we modify the turnpike economy to let agents live an arbitrary number of even periods.
We will consider this modification in two cases: one in which there is an initial date
and one without. The former is captured by t = 1, 2, ..., and the latter is captured by
t = ...,−1, 0, 1, ...
All agents live N periods where N is assumed to be even. Members of a new generation
are born with an endowment of goods but no money. They receive an endowment in every
odd period of their live. Since N is even, agents die after they have used their money to
purchase goods during their last period of life. An agent dies after market activities are
concluded and is replaced by a newborn agent the following period.
The matching technology is assumed to work as follows. In periods in which they
receive an endowment, agents born in period t meet with agents born in period t − 1. In
periods in which they do not have an endowment, agents born in period t meet with agents
born in period t+ 1.
Preferences have the same structure as in the modified turnpike model. They can be
written as
N
2
−1X
t=0
β2t+1
h
u(cht ) + u(c
f
t )
i
(19)
mt + st ≤ (ωt − τ t) ,
cft+1 ≤
mt
1 + z
,
cht+1 ≤ xst.
We assume that the CB operates in the same way as it did in the modified turnpike
with infinite lives. Again, we assume that β, the agents’ discount factor is equal to 1/x,
the inverse of the return on the storage technology.
Since βx = 1, agents only store goods in periods in which they receive an endowment.
Hence, each agent faces a sequence of identical 2 periods problem which can be written
h
u(ch) + u(cf )
i N2 −1X
t=0
β2t+1
m+ s ≤ (ω − τ) ,
cf ≤ m
1 + z
,
ch ≤ xs.
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We use logic that is similar to the case with infinite lives. Specifically, the central bank
chooses the money growth rate to maximize the following program
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
(∙
γ
1 + z
¸1−ρ
+ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ
) N
2
−1X
t=0
β2t+1.
C.1 The economy without an initial date
We assume that the time rate of preference in the social welfare function is the same as the
agent’s time rate of preference. Given the agent-replacement assumption, it is equivalent
to assess social welfare from the perspective of one agent that lives forever or from the
perspective of an infinite sequence of agents who live a finite number of periods. In other
words, as long as the size of the population remains constant over time, the welfare in the
economy with infinitely lived agents is proportional to the welfare in the economy with
finitely lived agents. Since there is no initial date, the planner’s objective is proportional
to
(ω − τ)1−ρ
1− ρ
(∙
γ
1 + z
¸1−ρ
+ [(1− γ)x]1−ρ
)
.
We can state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The optimal rate of growth of the money supply in this economy is given
by z = 0.
The proof is omitted since this result follows directly from the fact that the environments
in this section, the OG environment without an initial date and the turnpike environment
with infinitely lived agents solve the same set of equations.
C.2 The economy with an initial date
The analogy between the modified turnpike model with finite lives and the one with infi-
nitely lived agents also holds in the case in which there is an initial date. At the initial
date, the planner is faced with two types of agents: Those that receive their endowment
at even dates and those that receive their endowments at odd dates. From the point of
view of social welfare, it does not matter how many periods agents that are alive at date
t = 1 have left to live. Again, as long as the size of the population remains constant
(each agent who dies is replaced next period by a new agent) social welfare in an economy
with infinitely lived agents is proportional to social welfare in an economy with finitely
lived agents. Hence all result that hold for the OG economy and for the modified turnpike
economy with infinitely lived agents will also hold for finitely lived agents.
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